CT9′s problems are politically motivated and have become a thorn in the side of the British and Hong Kong governments. They have done untold harm to Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten’s image and thrown doubt on the ability of Britain to hold sensible communications with China. Indeed, they have shown that the British have little understanding of the Chinese logic and, at best, have failed to grasp the understanding that China cannot and will not lose face, no matter what it entails.
Hong Kong, the world’s busiest container port, will not have the capacity to meet projected demand by the time it is handed back to China in 1997. The eight Kwai Chung terminals and mid-stream operators will handle over nine million boxes in 1994, and will continue an already established annual increase of just over 14%.
Nearly all mainhaul container lines operate on a fixed-day, weekly sailing schedule, and it only takes a couple of hours delay in one port to throw a complete itinerary out of place. The financial burdens of such problems are well known by the big lines, and the need to charter replacement vessels is costly.
Plans to build an array of container terminals on reclaimed land at Tsing Yi and on Lantau Island were first announced in the late 80′s. The identity of the successful consortium members to build and operate the terminal was not known until 1992. Since then, political alliances and business jockeying have nearly derailed plans more than once. And the future is still unknown.
This is only an excerpt of Straddling 1997: The Future of Hong Kong Symbolized in Container Port Failure
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