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Teekay LNG Partners Invests In the Angola LNG Project
To facilitate the acquisition of Teekay’s interest in the Angola LNG Project, Teekay LNG Partners L.P. agreed to issue 3.7 million common units at a price of $38.88 per share, a discount of 4% from the closing price just prior to the announcement. Proceeds will be used to fund the equity purchase price of Teekay Corporation’s 33% interest in the Angola LNG Project as payment becomes due while using interim and remaining funds for the repayment of outstanding debt under one of its credit facilities, which matures in August 2018. Net of assumed debt, the total equity purchase price is approximately $73 million subject to adjustment based on actual costs incurred at the time of delivery. The company will acquire the ownership interests and pay a proportionate share of the purchase price as each vessel is delivered which is anticipated to be during the fall of 2011 and in the first quarter of 2012.
Written by: marinemoney | Categories: Freshly Minted, The Week in Review | April 7th, 2011 | Add a Comment
The Wall Street Journal’s Shipping Analysts Of the Year
For a Wall Street analyst the annual Wall Street Journal Best on the Street rankings is like an AcademyAward, only worth more, certainlyto those investors who bought basis the winning analysts picks.
This year Scott Burk at JPMorgan, but Bear Stearns when his picks were made (JPM acquired Bear Stearns in a sub-prime fire sale last March) came out number one in the Industrial Transportation classification. Doug Mavrinac of Jefferies & Co came in second and Omar Nokta with Dahlman Rose grabbed the third spot.
Why Capital Maritime Pulled its IPO – What it Means
Evangelos Marinakis had the world of shipping and capital markets contemplating and strategizing after Capital Maritime’s decision to withdraw its 16.7 million share IPO during pricing on Monday night. Goldman led the deal, while Bear Stearns and Jefferies played supporting roles as co-managers. With deals for Genco, Quintana, Wexford, and others confidentially filed by foreign issuers in the process of coming to market, Capital’s decision to pull has been a reality check for both issuers and underwriters that valuations are coming under increasing pressure with every new deal that comes to market, irrespective of the quality of the fleet and corporate structure.
Dissecting the Deal – Lessons Learned
Ironically, the factors that most influenced the pulling of this deal were determined before the company jumped on the first private jet out of Teterboro: the price range and the corporate structure. As we understand it, a solid group of blue chip institutional investors liked the Capital deal, especially in light of the fundamentals for the product tankers that Capital has on order. However, they became very focused on the price relative to the range.
Set the Range High and Negotiate Down
Unlike Eagle, which went to market at about 180% of net asset value and therefore had a lot of room to negotiate with investors, Capital was boxed in from the start. Goldman advised the company to put a very reasonable price on the cover of the red herring at $14-$16 (5.3x-5.8x EBITDA), hoping that investors would place enough market orders (which do not specify the price) to push the stock to the high end of the range or above it.
Unfortunately, since investors recently had their way with Aries, TBS and Eagle, they put in limit orders (which state a firm price) at $13 – or $2 below the range. The problem was that with a net asset value of about $15/share, Capital had little room to be negotiated down. This inflexibility was compounded by the fact that Evangelos Marinakis put his entire family fleet and management company into the public vehicle, making the impact of a dilutive deal even greater.
Don’t Offer Newbuildings If You Won’t Get Valuation Credit
Yield deals like Diana, Aries and Eagle were able to tap an investor community that focuses on valuations such as Price/EBITDA and dividend yield. However, Capital had much of its net worth in newbuilding contracts (which produce negative cash flow until the ships deliver) and therefore put the company squarely into the world of value – net asset value in this case – which allowed investors to feel they possessed the upper hand. This is not a new phenomenon; TEN has also struggled to have its fantastic newbuilding program assigned a fair value.
Keep It Simple
As superficial and shallow as it sounds, valuing the Capital fleet may have been more time consuming for investors than expected. As of June 3, 2005, the company’s existing fleet was comprised of 39 vessels of which twenty-six are product tankers, four are OBOs and nine are bulk carriers. In addition, Capital currently has 16 Ice Class 1A MR product tanker newbuildings on firm order, which are scheduled for delivery in January 2006 through November 2007. These tanker newbuildings have an aggregate carrying capacity of 665,500 deadweight tons and currently comprise the largest fleet of this type and size on order in the world. As sad as it sounds, valuing Capital’s fleet, which has a wide range of ages and types, may have required more of a commitment than the average value investor wanted to make.
Like many good deals, the sellers didn’t need the money, and indeed may have been disgusted by the way future partners valued the company after the efforts made to construct a first class investment opportunity. All in all, this was a good deal and it is a disappointment that it didn’t get completed. In the end, we think it is the investors who have lost out here. Although every deal seems to influence the next one, we do not think the pulling of this deal will have a major impact on future shipping IPOs – so long as issuers go into the market with reasonable expectations. The fact remains that at today’s high net asset values, issuing a minority interest in equity at even a slight premium is a very attractive proposition.
Why Capital Maritime Pulled its IPO – What it Means
Evangelos Marinakis had the world of shipping and capital markets contemplating and strategizing after Capital Maritime’s decision to withdraw its 16.7 million share IPO during pricing on Monday night. Goldman led the deal while Bear Stearns and Jefferies played supporting roles as co-managers. With deals for Genco, Quintana, Wexford, and others confidentially filed by foreign issuers in the process of coming to market, Capital’s decision to pull has been a reality check for both issuers and underwriters that valuations are coming under increasing pressure with every new deal that comes to market, irrespective of the quality of the fleet and corporate structure.
Dissecting the Deal – Lessons Learned
Ironically, the factors that most influenced the pulling of this deal were determined before the company jumped on the first private jet out of Teterboro: the price range and the corporate structure. As we understand it, a solid group of blue chip institutional investors liked the Capital deal, especially in light of the fundamentals for the product tankers that Capital has on order. However, they became very focused on the price relative to the range.
Set the Range High and Negotiate Down
Unlike Eagle, which went to market at about 180% of net asset value and therefore had a lot of room to negotiate with investors, Capital was boxed in from the start. Goldman advised the company to put a very reasonable price on the cover of the red herring at $14-$16 (5.3x-5.8x EBITDA), hoping that investors would place enough market orders (which do not specify the price) to push the stock to the high end of the range or above it.
Unfortunately, since investors recently had their way with Aries, TBS and Eagle, they put in limit orders (which state a firm price) at $13 – or $2 below the range. The problem was that with a net asset value of about $15/share, Capital had little room to be negotiated down. This inflexibility was compounded by the fact that Evangelos Marinakis put his entire family fleet and management company into the public vehicle, making the impact of a dilutive deal even greater.
Don’t Offer Newbuildings If You Won’t Get Valuation Credit
Yield deals like Diana, Aries and Eagle were able to tap an investor community that focuses on valuations such as Price/EBITDA and dividend yield. However, Capital had much of its net worth in newbuilding contracts (which produce negative cash flow until the ships deliver) and therefore put the company squarely into the world of value – net asset value in this case – which allowed investors to feel they possessed the upper hand. This is not a new phenomenon; TEN has also struggled to have its fantastic newbuilding program assigned a fair value.
Keep It Simple
As superficial and shallow as it sounds, valuing the Capital fleet may have been more time consuming for investors than expected. As of June 3, 2005, the company’s existing fleet was comprised of 39 vessels of which twenty-six are product tankers, four are OBOs and nine are bulk carriers. In addition, Capital currently has 16 Ice Class 1A MR product tanker newbuildings on firm order, which are scheduled for delivery in January 2006 through November 2007. These tanker newbuildings have an aggregate carrying capacity of 665,500 deadweight tons and currently comprise the largest fleet of this type and size on order in the world. As sad as it sounds, valuing Capital’s fleet, which has a wide range of ages and types, may have required more of a commitment than the average value investor wanted to make.
Like many good deals, the sellers didn’t need the money, and indeed may have been disgusted by the way future partners valued the company after the efforts made to construct a first class investment opportunity. All in all, this was a good deal and it is a disappointment that it didn’t get completed. In the end, we think it is the investors who have lost out here. Although every deal seems to influence the next one, we do not think the pulling of this deal will have a major impact on future shipping IPOs – so long as issuers go into the market with reasonable expectations. The fact remains that at today’s high net asset values, issuing a minority interest in equity at even a slight premium is a very attractive proposition.
TBS Offers Investors Blend of Dry Bulk and Liner
Last week we were delighted to see that TBS International Limited filed an S-1 with the U.S. SEC for an initial public offering on the NYSE under the ticker symbol TSI. The company seeks to raise up to $125 million through underwriters Merrill Lynch & Co. (who recently financed some of their ships and brought ex-Goldman Banker Mark Friedman on board in February to build a shipping practice) and Jefferies & Company. For those of you who aren’t familiar with the company, TBS is based in Yonkers, New York and provides liner, parcel, bulk and vessel chartering services on a select group of international routes, particularly between Latin America and China and Japan and South Korea. The company currently operates a fleet of 30 vessels, 13 of which are owned, nine of which are under charters with purchase options, and eight of which are under charters without such options.
TBS International’s strategy is and has been to stay away from the vagaries of the tramp market and instead target niche markets, where the necessity of local knowledge and strong customer relationships creates high barriers to entry. The company considers it important to tailor its scheduling to customers like Honeywell in hard-to-reach ports and with unusual carrying needs. Smaller vessels with flexible capabilities allow the vessels access to a variety of smaller ports that the more popular and economical larger vessels cannot reach. Proceeds from the offering are to allow the company to focus on increasing its market share in key routes while developing new trade routes through selected fleet expansion. As far as make-up, TBS intends to maintain its combination dry bulk and multipurpose tweendeckers focus. If suitable vessels are not available to purchase, then proceeds in the meantime will be used to repay debt and for working capital. Memoranda of agreement have, however, been completed for the purchase of three additional dry bulk vessels, as can be seen in the fleet list.
In the “Risk Factors” section, TBS International cites the extent to which its fate is linked with both the Chinese and global economies. The company notes that it has a history of losses – namely five loss-making years since 1997 – and that it filed for bankruptcy in 2000. A large part of this misfortune can be attributed, the company attests, to the sharp decline in the South American and Asian economies from which TBS derives much of its business. Unlike U.S.-flag Horizon Lines, TBS is fully subject to the volatility associated with international shipping; the hope, of course, is that this will also allow investors greater access to upside potential.
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