A funny thing happened on the way to the shipping crisis; the United States stock and bond market provided more than $24 billion of liquidity and saved the day – at least for those who benefitted directly. The substantial quantity of subordinated capital, which came in the form of unsecured high yield bonds, convertible bonds, common and preferred equity not only placated nervous banks, it actually spawned an entirely new chapter in the history of ship finance and marked the return of unlevered structures. But the infusion of so much outside capital has produced an unintended consequence: there is now appetite for modern, high quality asset values that those private owners looking for discounted ships have to face a stark reality: if they want quality, modern vessels they are going to have to pay the “retail” price.
And the competition for vessels is increasing. Preaching a “fresh start” and a “clean piece of paper without the entanglements of legacy loans and charters,” an entirely new crop of “freshman” public shipping companies have emerged and made themselves more attractive than some of the industry’s most experienced veterans in terms of valuation. Using tools like third party pools, third party technical managers and third party capital, the barriers to entry are low, even though long term success remains much more elusive. Although industry veterans are starting to push back on these new entrants, the fact is that they will keep coming.
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By Kevin Oates
…in the longer term shipping should correct but quality, transparency and financial strength are key to survival.
Despite the tough market and the general lack of ship finance, Marine Money’s Greek Ship Finance Forum again filled the seats in Athens. With 310 delegates and speakers and some 40 more for the TEN Ltd lunch, there was plenty gossip and exchange of views at the 11th Annual conference held on the 8th of October 2009.
The event had started with a speaker’s dinner the previous night co-hosted by Navios Maritime Holdings and was to end in the early hours of the following morning at the Capital Party co-hosted by Capital Product Partners LP at a well-known Athens nightclub. Even if the market is tough, we still know how to enjoy ourselves.
Back at the conference, our day began with Guy Verberne, a leading economist at Fortis Bank (Nederland) telling us that the economic recovery has come and it may well be sustainable. China, he says, has plenty foreign reserves to prolong it’s stimulus package for as long as it needs and he sees no meaningful cutbacks from the stimulus packages of western governments, at least through 2010. A risk is a double dip in 2011 if we get too bogged down in debt.
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Written by:
carisk | Categories:
Freshly Minted,
Market Commentary | October 15th, 2009 |
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It’s starting as a trickle, but banks are again developing the comfort level to close new deals and owners are becoming accustomed to the necessary changes in pricing, terms and covenants. HSH Nordbank, our 2007 winner for Greatest Contribution to Ship Finance, has since the fall been fielding accusations that it had stopped its ship lending. Countering such concerns, HSH announced this week two loans it has closed for Greek shipping companies, both of which were arranged in 2008 – and so are not unfinished business from before the credit crunch.
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Written by:
carisk | Categories:
Freshly Minted,
The Week in Review | March 13th, 2008 |
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Evangelos Marinakis had the world of shipping and capital markets contemplating and strategizing after Capital Maritime’s decision to withdraw its 16.7 million share IPO during pricing on Monday night. Goldman led the deal, while Bear Stearns and Jefferies played supporting roles as co-managers. With deals for Genco, Quintana, Wexford, and others confidentially filed by foreign issuers in the process of coming to market, Capital’s decision to pull has been a reality check for both issuers and underwriters that valuations are coming under increasing pressure with every new deal that comes to market, irrespective of the quality of the fleet and corporate structure.
Dissecting the Deal – Lessons Learned
Ironically, the factors that most influenced the pulling of this deal were determined before the company jumped on the first private jet out of Teterboro: the price range and the corporate structure. As we understand it, a solid group of blue chip institutional investors liked the Capital deal, especially in light of the fundamentals for the product tankers that Capital has on order. However, they became very focused on the price relative to the range.
Set the Range High and Negotiate Down
Unlike Eagle, which went to market at about 180% of net asset value and therefore had a lot of room to negotiate with investors, Capital was boxed in from the start. Goldman advised the company to put a very reasonable price on the cover of the red herring at $14-$16 (5.3x-5.8x EBITDA), hoping that investors would place enough market orders (which do not specify the price) to push the stock to the high end of the range or above it.
Unfortunately, since investors recently had their way with Aries, TBS and Eagle, they put in limit orders (which state a firm price) at $13 – or $2 below the range. The problem was that with a net asset value of about $15/share, Capital had little room to be negotiated down. This inflexibility was compounded by the fact that Evangelos Marinakis put his entire family fleet and management company into the public vehicle, making the impact of a dilutive deal even greater.
Don’t Offer Newbuildings If You Won’t Get Valuation Credit
Yield deals like Diana, Aries and Eagle were able to tap an investor community that focuses on valuations such as Price/EBITDA and dividend yield. However, Capital had much of its net worth in newbuilding contracts (which produce negative cash flow until the ships deliver) and therefore put the company squarely into the world of value – net asset value in this case – which allowed investors to feel they possessed the upper hand. This is not a new phenomenon; TEN has also struggled to have its fantastic newbuilding program assigned a fair value.
Keep It Simple
As superficial and shallow as it sounds, valuing the Capital fleet may have been more time consuming for investors than expected. As of June 3, 2005, the company’s existing fleet was comprised of 39 vessels of which twenty-six are product tankers, four are OBOs and nine are bulk carriers. In addition, Capital currently has 16 Ice Class 1A MR product tanker newbuildings on firm order, which are scheduled for delivery in January 2006 through November 2007. These tanker newbuildings have an aggregate carrying capacity of 665,500 deadweight tons and currently comprise the largest fleet of this type and size on order in the world. As sad as it sounds, valuing Capital’s fleet, which has a wide range of ages and types, may have required more of a commitment than the average value investor wanted to make.
Like many good deals, the sellers didn’t need the money, and indeed may have been disgusted by the way future partners valued the company after the efforts made to construct a first class investment opportunity. All in all, this was a good deal and it is a disappointment that it didn’t get completed. In the end, we think it is the investors who have lost out here. Although every deal seems to influence the next one, we do not think the pulling of this deal will have a major impact on future shipping IPOs – so long as issuers go into the market with reasonable expectations. The fact remains that at today’s high net asset values, issuing a minority interest in equity at even a slight premium is a very attractive proposition.
Written by:
carisk | Categories:
Equity,
Freshly Minted | June 30th, 2005 |
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Evangelos Marinakis had the world of shipping and capital markets contemplating and strategizing after Capital Maritime’s decision to withdraw its 16.7 million share IPO during pricing on Monday night. Goldman led the deal while Bear Stearns and Jefferies played supporting roles as co-managers. With deals for Genco, Quintana, Wexford, and others confidentially filed by foreign issuers in the process of coming to market, Capital’s decision to pull has been a reality check for both issuers and underwriters that valuations are coming under increasing pressure with every new deal that comes to market, irrespective of the quality of the fleet and corporate structure.
Dissecting the Deal – Lessons Learned
Ironically, the factors that most influenced the pulling of this deal were determined before the company jumped on the first private jet out of Teterboro: the price range and the corporate structure. As we understand it, a solid group of blue chip institutional investors liked the Capital deal, especially in light of the fundamentals for the product tankers that Capital has on order. However, they became very focused on the price relative to the range.
Set the Range High and Negotiate Down
Unlike Eagle, which went to market at about 180% of net asset value and therefore had a lot of room to negotiate with investors, Capital was boxed in from the start. Goldman advised the company to put a very reasonable price on the cover of the red herring at $14-$16 (5.3x-5.8x EBITDA), hoping that investors would place enough market orders (which do not specify the price) to push the stock to the high end of the range or above it.
Unfortunately, since investors recently had their way with Aries, TBS and Eagle, they put in limit orders (which state a firm price) at $13 – or $2 below the range. The problem was that with a net asset value of about $15/share, Capital had little room to be negotiated down. This inflexibility was compounded by the fact that Evangelos Marinakis put his entire family fleet and management company into the public vehicle, making the impact of a dilutive deal even greater.
Don’t Offer Newbuildings If You Won’t Get Valuation Credit
Yield deals like Diana, Aries and Eagle were able to tap an investor community that focuses on valuations such as Price/EBITDA and dividend yield. However, Capital had much of its net worth in newbuilding contracts (which produce negative cash flow until the ships deliver) and therefore put the company squarely into the world of value – net asset value in this case – which allowed investors to feel they possessed the upper hand. This is not a new phenomenon; TEN has also struggled to have its fantastic newbuilding program assigned a fair value.
Keep It Simple
As superficial and shallow as it sounds, valuing the Capital fleet may have been more time consuming for investors than expected. As of June 3, 2005, the company’s existing fleet was comprised of 39 vessels of which twenty-six are product tankers, four are OBOs and nine are bulk carriers. In addition, Capital currently has 16 Ice Class 1A MR product tanker newbuildings on firm order, which are scheduled for delivery in January 2006 through November 2007. These tanker newbuildings have an aggregate carrying capacity of 665,500 deadweight tons and currently comprise the largest fleet of this type and size on order in the world. As sad as it sounds, valuing Capital’s fleet, which has a wide range of ages and types, may have required more of a commitment than the average value investor wanted to make.
Like many good deals, the sellers didn’t need the money, and indeed may have been disgusted by the way future partners valued the company after the efforts made to construct a first class investment opportunity. All in all, this was a good deal and it is a disappointment that it didn’t get completed. In the end, we think it is the investors who have lost out here. Although every deal seems to influence the next one, we do not think the pulling of this deal will have a major impact on future shipping IPOs – so long as issuers go into the market with reasonable expectations. The fact remains that at today’s high net asset values, issuing a minority interest in equity at even a slight premium is a very attractive proposition.
Written by:
carisk | Categories:
Equity,
Freshly Minted | June 30th, 2005 |
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